Can Social Media Incite a War?
Can Social Media Incite a War?
Social media is unlikely to incite an authoritarian regime to war, but some mechanisms could make social media either a stabilizing or a destabilizing force.
Su-35 on display; Public Domain
Late on September 4th in the southern Chinese city of Guilin, one of the PLAAF’s most advanced fighter jets, the Sukhoi-35, crashed after the pilot ejected. Almost as soon as footage began to emerge, speculation on social media claimed Taiwan anti-aircraft missiles had shot the jet down for intruding on airspace. The conspiracy theory was especially popular in India which is itself embroiled in escalating tensions with China. The speculation became acute enough, the RoC Ministry of National Defense issued a press release denying involvement.
While, this particular instance was unlikely to ever create enough of a furor to cause an international war, it is reasonable to worry if future social media speculation might not make more war likely, even creating a casus belli out of whole cloth. Yellow journalism—arguably the nadir of the American press—bears some responsibility for whipping up American sentiment leading to the Spanish-American War. It is not unreasonable to imagine that “citizen journalism,” unmoored from journalistic norms might play a similar role in instigating war online. Given the apparent role online activism plays in mobilizing groups towards violence in America’s cities today, might not a similar dynamic lead to international violence?
Social media alone are unlikely to cause a war, but understanding the role of information in the war’s outbreak demonstrates how and where social media might incite war. In states with all kinds of governments, information is a part of military and political leaderships’ decisions to go to war, however, information is used differently in democratic versus authoritarian governments. For simplicities sake, this article explains the ways in which authoritarian governments use information in the lead-up to wars. If there were a country likely to start a war over the purported shoot down of a jet, it would be China, not Taiwan. The CCP is pre-eminent among all non-democratic governments, and China consequently represents an archetype which is both uniquely capable and uniquely important. Understanding how online information might play a role in China escalating to war not only explains this particular case, but also provides a type for any future cases, whether they involve China or not. At some point in the future, expect an article to explain similar pressures in democracies.
Information in the Decisions to Go to War
International relations is famously bereft of explanations for why specific wars breakout, but generally scholarship generally agrees that modern wars start when the government thinks the war is advantageous. In the pre-Modern era, wars might broken out over less-rational things, like personal insults to the monarch, but modern governments serve as checks on many trivial reasons for war unless other incentives align. While the King and his brothers might be willing and able to wage war for whatever reason struck them in a feudal monarchy, getting a modern military of any kind to support a war for such trivial reasons would be difficult.
Of course, rational explanations of war run into one fundamental problem: war is always, always irrational. No matter what you gain from a war, the value of the gain is always outweighed by the war’s cost, and only the winner gets anything at all. Rational governments should negotiate rather than fight
There are two gaps in information that create the gaps through which most wars fall. First, war is inherently uncertain. You may be better at fighting than your opponent, or more committed to war, and the only way to resolve that ambiguity is to fight a war. Second, while the war’s costs now may be bad, in the future the cost will only be worse. If political leadership believes that an adversary is getting more powerful, and at some point in the future is likely want something intolerable, it is reasonable to conclude that fighting now will be less costly, if still bad.
While information about resolve, capabilities, or intent is information, social media does not generally provide such information, especially not for an authoritarian regime. Social media is no better at forecasting a war’s outcome than any other information source, and therefore shouldn’t have any bearing at all on a government’s decision to go to war.
So that’s it then? No social media created war? It would be, but it is at least possible that popular outrage can force an otherwise reluctant authoritarian government into a conflict it would rather avoid.
Social Pressure
Social media might foment domestic discontent, increasing social pressure for war. If Taiwan really had shot down a Su-35, I find it likely Chinese social media would have exploded in nationalistic fervor. It seems probable to me that the CCP would allow the protests to continue, to strengthen their bargaining position with Taiwan and the US, at least in the short term. Pointing to a rabid mob saying, “I simply cannot accept those terms, because those guys over there will kill me” can be surprisingly a surprisingly convincing negotiating tactic.
Observers in democracies should not discount protests in states with authoritarian governments simply because other protests would not be allowed. Even though the government would be allowing nationalist sentiment to express itself for cynical reasons, the sentiment is just as genuine as in democracies. There are patriots in every country, regardless of regime type, and their outrage is not less genuine because it can only be expressed under certain circumstances. When the dogs of war bay for blood in the streets, leadership may feel foreign war is easier than domestic repression.
It is at least conceivable that a real furor created by a fake incident could start a war. The Spanish American War started because the Maine exploded in Havana Harbor, which the public blamed Spain for, even though the Navy quickly concluded the explosion was not sabotage. In late August, a riot broke out when word circulated online that police had shot a man, who had actually committed suicide. Last weeks rumors in China were never threatening, mostly because the rumors seem to have mostly been outside China, and Guilin is implausibly far from Taiwan, for Taiwan to be responsible. Nonetheless, a more plausible kerfuffle on social media could instigate pressure on the government that the government eventually succumbs to.
Authoritarian Keep a Tight Lid on Things
Authoritarian regimes have many tools to resist pressure to go to war, if the government does not want to go to war. Indulging protests that help the government achieve its aims is more risky than not allowing protests at all, but in few cases will threaten the government’s control. As long as the government chose to switch from “no protesting” to “some protesting” (as opposed to being unable to stop protests) it will probably be able to return to “no protesting” whenever it wants. Since pure social media furor is unlikely to have affected a government’s capability substantially, they probably would retain the ability to stop protests if they wanted to.
Online information also allows authoritarian governments more power to censor information selectively, to control what might set off a furor in the first place. While authoritarian governments have long controlled information, censorship was a lot more blunt before the internet. It was easy to burn presses, stop all shipments of books or jam radio broadcasts.
Blunt censorship is prone to backfiring, especially in crisis situations. Even more obtuse subjects probably ascertained when news from the Eastern Front was suddenly cut off, something foul might be afoot. Online authoritarians can censor only the information they do not want to get through. China may have blocked social media posts about the Guilin crash, while allowing information about the weather in Guilin, or pictures of an Su-35 from a recent airshow. Selective censorship prevents a noticeable gap from becoming information itself.
More important still is the ability to surveil online activism, which poses the theoretical threat. Any attempt to organize social pressure on social media will be inherently observable by the authorities. Those observations will help stamp out “undesirable” activism, especially if any pressure attempts to organize online. While social media conceivably allows activists around the world to converse with one another, it also allows governments the ability to watch, and counter, what they are doing.
Social Media Might Restrain Authoritarian Adventurism
The threat of coups could combine with the information online to make authoritarian governments less likely to escalate to war. If there is a single fact widely known to authoritarian leaders, but almost forgotten among democratic publics, it is that the #1 threat to authoritarian regimes is not popular uprising, but coups. Foreign wars are especially risky, because empowering military leaders to fight wars might also allow them to topple the domestic government. When Marius and Sulla turned their armies against Rome, the tradition of military men using military power to install themselves as leaders in their homeland was already ancient. Furthermore, if the government needs the military’s strength at home, having them abroad fighting wars is incredibly unhelpful.
In the case of a social media–generated crisis, potential coup leaders and the government would both have the same information, or at least most of it. Launching an unnecessary war, even at the behest of popular demand, can quickly turn both popular and military opinion against the central government. Coups do not rely on popular support, but popular support helps. Social media could make it easier for military leaders to assess when the time might be right to strike against the government. A smart authoritarian leader knows that the same mobs crying for foreign blood today online might tomorrow be howling for his head just a few days later if things go awry.
Governments are aware of the threat coups pose, and consequently institute controls that make it unlikely a local commander independently will start a war because of social media, too. Authoritarians governments normally employ multiple layers of domestic intelligence, with watchers watching watchers watching watchers. Those layers of control may not prevent powerful generals from successfully mounting a coup, because the benefit of seizing government power is tremendously tempting. Starting a war the government doesn’t want for a slight you know did not happen, has little upside for the local commander.
Risks of War Remain, With or Without Social Media
With all of these reassurances and controls that should prevent authoritarian governments from accidentally escalating to war, you might wonder how authoritarians get into wars at all? The answer is: the same way everyone gets into wars, by making bad decisions. Just because your population and your military can’t drag the government into war unwillingly based on fictitious offenses, doesn’t mean the political leadership can’t convince itself war is the best of bad options, based on real events. Unfortunately, leadership may even sometimes be right.
While it is unlikely social media could ever create a war out of whole-cloth, it is not impossible, and the obstacles to an online created war also imply when one might happen. If the government already wants war for other reasons, social media hype may just be a convenient pretext as good as any other. If the government is especially weak, it may be subject to domestic coercion because it cannot turn the protests off. If the government wants to leech away a military that has become too powerful, or the military thinks launching a war will allow it to install a government it prefers, war may happen. Each of these circumstances could arise with or without social media, and even though social media affects how the events would play out, it would not be necessary for such circumstances to arise.
War is unlikely between the US and China specifically because they are both nuclear powers. Both countries rightly take nuclear weapons seriously, and nothing ginned up on social media is likely to get the President or Chairman to open up their respective “nuclear footballs.” Simply put, the cost of a single nuclear weapon detonating in a US or Chinese city overwhelms whatever costs a Twitter mob, even one manifest in the real world, might be able to impose. It may seem scant comfort, but at the end of the day, the great powers have been at peace for 75 years because they scare the crap out of each other. I, for one, am glad of it.
David Benson is a Professor of Strategy and National Security focusing on cyberstrategy and international relations. You can reach him at dbenson@osiriscodex.com.
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